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IN THE SUP,REME COURT 
of the 
SITATE OF UTAH 
BERNICE ~CULLEY, Etxecutrix of 
the Estate of VIRGIL J. ·CTJLLE;y, 
deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GARFIELD SMELTERMEN'S 
CRE,DIT UNION, and S. L. LE!S'.TER 
President; GLEN M. JONE·S·, Vice-
President; and AL ROBINS·ON, 
Treasurer, 
De f en.dants. 
vs. 
DOUGLAS K. ~CULLE·Y, 
Interpleading Plaintiff 





The Appellant's statement of the disposition in the 
Lower ,c·ourt is correct. 
The appellant's statements of the facts are so slanted 
in his favor, and in many instances, so incorrect, that 
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the respondent feels compelled to restate the facts as 
they were interpreted by respondent and the Lower 
:Court. 
On March 10, 1960, Virgil J. ,Culley, who was a 
roaster operator at the Garfield Smelter and who had 
very little education, and who, at the time had been 
married to the respondent for more than two years, 
opened an account at the Garfield Smeltermen's 'Credit 
Union and at the time he opened this account he signed 
a joint share agreement card. Contra to what the appel-
lant has stated in his facts there was only one account 
opened and the joint share agreement was not the type 
of agreement which is uniformly used by banks and 
savings and loan companies but was strictly a joint 
share agreement card as was used by the Garfield Smel-
termen's ~Credit Union. We feel that the distinction is 
so important th~t we are setting out the joint share 
agreement card as was introduced in evidence and as 
is set forth on page 8-A of the transcript: 
'The ---------------------------------------- Credit Union is 
hereby authorized to recognize any of the sig-
natures subscribed hereto in the payment of funds 
or the transaction of any business for this ac-
count. 'The joint owners of this account, hereby 
agree with each other and 'vith said Credit "Cnion 
that all sums now paid in on shares, or heretofore 
or hereafter paid thereon, are and shall be owned 
by them jointly, ''"'i th right of survivorship and be 
subject to the "'"ithdra,Yal or receipt of any of 
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them, and payment to any of them or the survivor 
or survivors shall be valid and discharge said 
'Credit Union from any liability for such payment. 
Any or all of said joint owners may pledge 
all or any part of the shares in this account as 
collateral security to a loan or loans. 
The right or authority of the credit union 
under this agreement shall not he changed or 
terminated by said owners, or any of them except 
by written notice to said credit union 'vhich Rhall 
not affect transactions theretofore made. 
Contra to vvhat the appellant has stated in his facts 
the account was not carried in the name of the deceased, 
\Tirgil J. ·c·ulley, and Douglas Culley, the appellant, but 
·was carried strictly in the name of Virgil J. Culley. The 
only connection which the appellant has or ever had with 
this account or intended to have was having his name 
placed on the joint share agreement card Rolely and 
wholly for testamentary reasons. ·These important facts 
were eompletely left out of the appellant's statement of 
facts and respondent feels that they are so important 
that, 'vith the 1Court's indulgence, we "rould like to set 
forth, briefly, the appellant's sworn testimony. In this 
regard, said testimony starting and being set forth on 
page 105 of the transcript : 
Question: Now this particular account which 
is subject to this action, did you make any deposits 
or \vithdrawals on this account~ · 
.A.nswer: I did not. 
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The- Court: lie admitte-d he did not. 
The ic·ourt : It is also admitted that the 
deceased was not indebted to him. 
Question: I understand you discussed this 
account with him. 
Answer: ··That's true. 
·Question : Did you ever have any discussions 
with him about whether or not you could put 
money in or take it out of this account~ 
Answer : No, sir, I didn't. 
Question: And you never intended to take 
any money out of this a.ccount, did you~ 
Answer: That's absolutely right. 
Question : And you never intended to deposit 
any money in this account, did you~ 
Answer: That's true. 
Question : And you never intended to have 
any access to this account, did you~ 
Answer: After dad's death, yes. 
Question : While he lived you never intended 
to have any access to it at all~ 
Answer: No sir, I didn't, no sir. 
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Question: And you never co-signed with him 
on any loans or deposits, and I am asking about 
this account. 
Answer: No. 
Question: Well, didn't you stipulate in this 
court that at the time that your dad - Your dad 
wasn't indebted to you at any time at the time 
this card was signed~ 
Answer: That's true. 
Question: And he didn't owe you any money' 
Answer: ·That's right .. 
Question: And you never claimed any part 
of this account during his life time, did you' 
Answer: Not while he was living. 
Question: And you never had any right to 
withdraw any portion of it~ 
Answer : I stated that. 
Question : And at the time you signed the 
card which is Plaintiff's Exhibit One, you never 
obtained any interest in the $500.00 that was in 
there at that time, did you~ 
Answer: No sir. 
Question: What did your father tell you 
when you signed this card~ 
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Answer: He· told me point-blank I was to see 
that the boys was provided and taken care of. 
Question : That was back in 1960 ~ 
Answer: ·That's right. 
Question: He was in good health at that 
time~ 
Answer : He certainly was. 
Question: And he had $500.00 in the credit 
union~ 
Answer: That's true. 
Question : And he owed some $2,302.42, isn't 
that correct~ 
·Answer: That's correct. 
~Question : And at the time he had in the 
credit union $565.93 ~ 
Answer: That's true. 
Question: And he owed, actually, if you de-
duct this, $1,728.05. Isn't that correct~ 
Answer: Yes, sir, that's true. 
Question : D'O you know from your conver-
sation with him that you never intended and he 
never intended to give you any interest whatever 
in this money, did he~ In this $500.00 ~ 
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Answer: I have already told you that in the 
event of his death I was supposed. . . 
Question: You never claimed any inte_rest 
in the money which was in the bank at the time, 
did you~ 
Answer: No, I didn't. 
Question: And you don't claim that you had 
any right to put money in or take money out of 
this account during your father's life do you~ 
Answer: No. 
Virgil J. Culley died on the 17th day of October, 
19:63, and at the time of his death he left $770.00 in this 
account at the Garfield Smeltermen's :Ctedit Union. 
·He also had a Pontiac automobile and a trailer which 
were in his own name, both of which were heavily encum-
bered and all of which was paid off by reason of insur-
ance which was carried on the accounts which paid off 
the Pontiac car, the trailer, and doubled the $770.00 
which is the subject of this action. On the 21st day of 
September, 19·63, Virgil J. ·Culley, deceased, did draw 
a will and in the will he specifically stated, "I make no 
provision in this, my last will and testament, for my 
children, Buddy Lee Culley, Laurie J o Culley, Rodney 
Brent Culley, D!ouglas Kent 'Culley and Chad ~Culley, 
and I have purposely excluded them and each of them 
from participation in this, my last will and testament, 
and it is my desire that none of my children taken any 
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part of my estate." He then provided that should anyone 
contest the will they should receive One Dollar. 1The re-
spondent testified that it was the desire of Virgil J. 'Culley 
that this $770.00 in the credit union be used for his funeral 
expenses. ·The will did not disown his children. It is 
obvious that the decedent knew that he had only suffi-
cient money to bury himself. 
ARGUME.NT 
DOUGLAS K. CULLEY, THE APPELLANT HEREIN, 
TESTIFIED IN T·HE LOWER COURT THAT 'THE JOINT 
SHARE ARGEEMENT WAS CREATED BY VIRGIL J. CUL-
LEY AND :THE APPELLANT, DOUGLAS CULLEY, WITH 
AND FOR THE SOLE INTENTION THAT DOUGLAS K. 
CULLEY, THE APPELLANT, AS SURVIVOR, IF ENTITLED 
TO ANY MONEY AT ALL, SHOULD HAVE THE REMAIN-
ING FUNDS AT THE TIME OF DEPOSITER'S DE~TH AND 
THAT THE SHARE AGREEMENT WAS PURELY AN AT-
TEMPTED TESTAMENTARY TRANSFER AND AS SUCH, 
SAID AGREEMENT IS VOID FOR F AlLURE TO COMPLY 
WITH SE;CTION 74-1-5 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953. 
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The appellant relies on, and has cited for his po-
sition, Braegger vs. L-oveland, 12· Utah 2d 384-367, P·.2d, 
177; and Tangren vs. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388-367 P·.2d 
179. :The foregoing cases have no application to the pre-
sent case, either in facts or in law. The ·Court will recall 
that in Tangren vs. Ingalls, the case came up via a 
summary judgment and this Court sent it back for a new 
trial with instructions that the lower court was to dete-r-
mine whether or not the appellant could meet the re-
quirement of presenting a clear and convincing evidence 
with which to attack the recital of the deposit cards. 
There was also some evidence of· gift to the exte·nt of 
$4,000.00 and up to the time of notice there was no 
question that Adeline· M. Ingalls could withdraw and 
place money in the account. None of these facts a.re 
present in the subject case. In Braegger vs. Loveland, 
12 Utah 2d 384-367, P.2d, 177, the testimony was that 
either party could withdraw money and that up to a 
month before her brother's death Emma withdrew money 
and deposited it in an account of her own name. The 
Court further held that there was strong evidence of an 
intent to make a gift. 
The foregoing cases are both distinguishable from 
this case in that in the instant case the sworn testimony 
of the appellant himself established the fact that V. S. 
Culley, deceased, never surrendered dominion and control 
of this account and that there was no intention of a. gift 
of any type or nature. 'The Court's attention is again 
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ealled to the fact that this share agreement which is thP 
subject of this action is entirely different from the usual 
agreements whieh are now used by savings and loan asso-
ciations. IThe ones which are presently used by the banks 
and savings and loan associations set forth an agreement 
~uch as follows : '''The placing of the funds in the· ac-
count shall he eonclusively intended to be a gift and a 
delivery of the funds to the joint tenants to the extent 
of the prorated interest in the account." ~This, of course, 
is plaeed in the joint share agreement for the protection 
of the banks and the saving-s and loan associations. It is 
also complet~ ly laeking in the credit union agreement 
w ..hich is· set forth herein. An analysis of the credit union 
agreement shows that it was obviously drawn for the Role 
protection of the credit union. 'The rCourt's attention i~ 
further dra\vn to the fact that in order to make out a gift 
the law requires a donative intent, the relinquishment of 
domination by the donor, and an acceptance by the donee, 
( Ree .Bro,vn~ Pers()nal Prop·erty, Section 37, Second Edi-
tion~ 1936). It is obvious from the facts of this case that 
there was no present proprietary interest given and the 
depositor, \,... ~J. Culley, deceased, retained full and com-
pL·te interest and dominion over the aeeount. The appel-
L.~lt adrnittedly did not deposit into said account, could 
not take funds fro1n the aeeount and had no interest in 
the aecount of any ty-pe or nature exrept upon the death 
of the depositor. 
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It has long been the established law that in order 
to make out a gift there must be an intervivos interest 
and there must exist an intention that each party shall 
have the present and equal right to withdraw the funds, 
(see Hag-gerty vs. Haggerty, Flo. 1951, 52 S.2d, 432; 
Spark vs. Canney, 88 S.2d, 307; and Murray vs. Gadsden, 
91 U.S. App. D.C., 38, 197 F.2d, 19,4, 33 A.L.R. 2·d 554). 
The courts are quite uniform in applying the test of a 
gift intervivos, for such there is required a clear intention 
of the donor to transfer a present interest, delivery by 
surrender of dominion and control to the donee, and 
acceptance of the gift by the donee. The rules have been 
1nodified by the nature of a joint fund but the basic ele-
ments are the same: donative intent, delivery. Not the 
money, in specie, in the joint fund, but a gift of an 
undivided interest in the funds and a surender of an 
equal right to withdraw the funds and the acceptance by 
the donee, (see McKinnon vs. First National Bank of 
Pensacola, 77 Flo. 777, 82 S. 7 48, 6 A.L.R. 111; K ilng vs. 
Ktng, Flo., 1951, 55 S.2d 181; Webster vs. St. Petersbu.rg 
Federal Savings and Loan Assoc~ation, 15·5 Fla., 412 
20 S.2d, 400; Chase Federal Savings wnd Loan Associ-
ation vs. Sullivan, 19'61, Flo. 127 S.2d, 112). 
The appellant completely failed to prove a joint 
tenancy in that there was no concurrence of the four 
unities of time, title, interest and possession. In this 
regard, the appellant had no right to put money in the 
account and had no right to take it out and the original 
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$500.00 had been disposed of numerous times prior to 
the death of the depositor. The appellant admitted that 
he had no right of possession whatsoever and the evi-
dence shows that the only purpose in putting Douglas 
Culley's name on the share agreement card was either 
to make him \ 1• J. ~Culley's agent or to create in him a 
right of survivorship \Yithout any present right to any 
part of the account. 
The appellant obtained no interest whatsoever in the 
joint account by reason of a contract. In this regard 
the evidence shows that the account card was provided 
by the_ credit union for the sole protection of the credit 
union. The evidence further reveals that it was never 
intended by the parties that the contract should deter-
mine the rights of the parties. The appellant readily 
admitting that there was no consideration and that the 
depositor had full and complete dominion over the ac-
count and that appellant had none. ·Thus all of the 
elements of the contract are lacking. 
~CONCLUSION 
The ~Court's attention is respectfully called to the 
fact that the lower court determined this case on the 
sworn testimony of the appellant. The court properly 
found that this joint fund was created by V. J. Culley 
with the sole intention that Douglas Culley, as survivor, 
would only inherit at the time of the death of V. J. 
,c·ulley. The plaintiff clearly rebutted the presumption 
that \r. J. Culley ever surrendered or intended to sur-
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thereof to Douglas 'Culley or that Douglas Culley ever 
accepted any interest in the funds during the life time 
of V. J. Culley. It is obvious that the requirements of a 
gift intervivos have never been met. In view of this, 
this instrument certainly violates the statute of wills 
and fails to comply with any parts thereof and a con-
trary ruling would operate to deceive the claims of those 
entitled to priority over testamentary beneficiaries, in-
cluding creditors and rights of widows to have their 
dower set apart. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK S. MINE.R 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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